Several cross-country studies have observed a negative correlation between inequality and interpersonal trust. Using data from 59 countries, I instrument for inequality using the relative size of the mature-aged cohort, and find that a rise in inequality reduces trust. D
Trust, inequality, and ethnic heterogeneity
Economic theory has shown that the payoff in repeated games can be higher under conditions in which the players trust one another. In a society with high levels of generalized trust, individuals may be more willing to contract with others. In the presence of imperfect information, costly enforcement or coordination failures, high levels of trust can raise economic efficiency (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004) .
But what determines why some communities are more trusting than others? Two potentially important factors are ethnic heterogeneity and income inequality -both of which have been shown to be negatively correlated with trust. Across US cities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) and across Australian neighborhoods (Leigh, 2006a) , ethnic heterogeneity appears to be more important than inequality. But cross-national studies have typically found that the negative relationship between trust and income inequality dominates (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Uslaner, 2002) . Most of these studies do not deal with the possibility of reverse causation -that inequality might itself be affected by trust.
Supposing inequality or ethnic heterogeneity affect trust, what are the causal channels through which this effect could operate? Summarizing the literature on heterogeneity and cooperation, Bandiera et al. (2005) suggest that (a) homogeneous communities might be better at solving collective action problems because members have similar tastes; (b) individuals might dislike working with others outside their group; (c) heterogeneity may lead to disagreement over how to share public goods; and (d) heterogeneity might undermine the ability to devise mechanisms that sustain trust and cooperation. In the case of inequality, they also suggest that an unequal distribution of resources might favor rent-seeking in the case of common pool resources.
Alternatively, causation could run the opposite direction. One way that trust might affect inequality is if low levels of trust lead to less provision of public goods, and higher levels of post-tax inequality. Alternatively, trust might affect ethnic heterogeneity, for example if countries with high levels of trust were less inclined to admit immigrants.
Empirical strategy and results
One way to identify whether inequality has a causal effect on trust is to find an instrument that is correlated with inequality, and is only likely to be correlated with trust through its effect on inequality. A useful candidate is cohort size. Higgins and Williamson (2002) point out that because bfat cohortsQ tend to get low rewards, earnings inequality will be reduced when there is a labor market glut at the top of the age-earnings curve, and increased when there is a glut of old or young adults. They show that the ratio of the size of the cohort aged between 40 and 59 to the population aged 15 to 69 is a powerful predictor of inequality, both across and within countries. The distribution of the population along the age-earnings curve should affect inequality, but ought not have any direct impact on trust, except through the channel of inequality.
To test this, I use data from the European and World Values Surveys Integrated Data File. After merging in some additional variables from other datasets, my sample covers 82,778 respondents in 59 countries. Forty-eight of the countries were surveyed in 1999-2000, and 11 countries were surveyed in 1995-97 (these are all countries that were not surveyed in 1999-2000). As a measure of trust, respondents were asked bGenerally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?Q. Respondents who said bmost people can be trustedQ were coded as 1, while those who said that byou need to be very careful dealing with peopleQ were coded as 0.
1 The data were then collapsed to the country level. As a measure of inequality, I use the gini coefficient, which is a measure of the income gap between any two randomly selected individuals in the population, and is therefore the most appropriate measure of inequality for this purpose. Gini coefficients are drawn from the World Income Inequality Database, taking care to use only measures of income inequality that cover the entire population (on the comparability of inequality measures, see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001 ). Two other national-level controls are also included: the log of GDP per capita in US dollars at purchasing power parity (from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database), and a Herfindahl-type index of ethnic fractionalization, measuring the chance that two randomly selected people in a country are from the same group (from Alesina et al., 2003) . Table 1 presents the summary statistics. Table 2 estimates the relationship between inequality and trust in a simple OLS specification, controlling for average per capita income and ethnic heterogeneity. A 10 point increase in the gini coefficient is associated with a 5% point fall in the fraction of the population who agree that most people can be trusted. Trust is positively associated with average income, and negatively associated with ethnic fractionalization, though these relationships are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
In Table 3 , I use the size of the mature-aged cohort (the ratio of the size of the cohort aged between 40 and 59 to the population aged 15 to 69) as an instrument for inequality. The first stage regression is strong and significant, with approximately a one-to-one relationship between the relative size of the mature-aged cohort and the gini coefficient. Using this instrumental variables approach, the effect of inequality on trust is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of the effect is slightly larger in the IV specification than in the OLS specification. The coefficient suggests that a 10 point rise in the gini coefficient would lead to a 6% fall in the fraction of people agreeing that most people can be trusted.
An alternative approach is to run the regressions at an individual level, controlling for the respondent's years of schooling, gender, marital status, age and age 2 , but clustering standard errors at a country level. Note that by carrying out the regression at an individual level, rather than collapsing all data to the country level, it is possible to instrument with the size of the mature-aged cohort, controlling Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets.
for the age of the individual respondent (helping to satisfy the exclusion restriction for the instrument). Using this approach, the coefficient on inequality, instrumented with the size of the mature age cohort, is À0.60 ( p = 0.04) (see Leigh, 2006b for details).
Conclusion
Instrumenting for inequality with the relative size of a country's mature age cohort indicates that across countries, inequality has a causal effect of lowering trust. The finding that inequality matters more than ethnic heterogeneity is the opposite of what has been found across US cities and Australian neighborhoods. Three possible ways in which these results could be reconciled are that these two nations are exceptional; that inequality measures are more comparable across countries than measures of ethnic heterogeneity; or that trust is affected by ethnic diversity at the local level, and by inequality at the national level. Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets.
